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Taking Control of Regulations: How International
Advocacy NGOs Shape the Regulatory Environments of
their Target Countries*
Andrew Heiss
Georgia State University
aheiss@gsu.edu

A wave of legislative and regulatory crackdown on international nongovernmental organizations
(INGOs) has constricted the legal environment for foreign advocacy groups interested in inﬂuencing domestic and global policy. Although the legal space for advocacy is shrinking, many INGOs
have continued their work and found creative ways to adapt to these restrictions, sometimes even
reshaping the regulatory environments of their target countries in their favor. In this article, I explore what enables INGOs to cope with and reshape their regulatory environments. I bridge international relations and interest group literatures to examine the interaction between INGO resource
conﬁgurations and institutional arrangements. I argue that the interaction between resources and
institutions provide organizations with ‘programmatic ﬂexibility’ that enables them to adjust their
strategies without changing their core mission. I illustrate this argument with case studies of Article
19 and AMERA International and demonstrate how organizations with high programmatic ﬂexibility
can navigate regulations and shape policy in their target country, while those without this ﬂexibility
are shut out of policy discussions and often the target country itself. I conclude by exploring how
the interaction between internal characteristics and institutional environments shape and constrain
the effects of interest groups in global governance.

Legal crackdowns against international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have increased substantially since 2000. Dozens of authoritarian countries
have passed harsh new anti-NGO regulations, including Russia, Egypt, China, Bahrain,
*
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Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. In 2017, CIVICUS reported that only 3% of the world’s
population lives in countries that impose minimal restrictions on associational activity, while most face obstructed or repressed civic space (CIVICUS 2017). However, while the legal space for global advocacy organizations is closing, many INGOs continue to work in their target countries by finding creative ways to adapt
to more restrictive regulations. In some cases, international interest groups have
adapted so well that they have been able to shape the regulatory environment of
their target countries in their favor. What enables international advocacy NGOs
to cope with repressive regulations, achieve advocacy goals, and influence their
regulatory environments?
We can explore possible answers to this question by combining research on
INGOs and interest groups. International advocacy NGOs fit well into the category of ‘interest group’ – these organizations attempt to affect government policy
and influence the public good, both in domestic politics and in global governance
institutions. Moreover, we can use the concept of opportunity structures to theorize the conditions under which INGOs can have advocacy effects under repressive
regulations. In this paper, I examine the interaction between two of the opportunity structures identified by Dellmuth and Bloodgood (this special issue): resource
configurations and institutional arrangements. In research on interest groups, institutional arrangements define the strategies available to advocacy organizations.
Research on INGOs and nonprofit organizations, on the other hand, has tended to
look at how the internal characteristics of INGOs or how the links and relationships between INGOs enable these organizations to be effective in global governance (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2017; Wong 2012). The effects of institutional environments and the interaction between INGO resources and institutional arrangements are relatively unexplored within international relations and interest groups
literatures (Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, and Prakash 2014; Heiss and Johnson 2016;
Tallberg et al. 2018) .
In this paper, I bridge research in international relations, nonprofit management,
and interest groups to examine how the interaction between resource configurations and institutional constraints provides INGOs with what I term ‘programmatic
flexibility’, or the ability to navigate and adapt to the institutional constraints they
face and achieve their advocacy goals without losing mission focus. I examine how
resource configurations and institutional factors influence INGO strategy and propose my primary argument: programmatic flexibility permits INGOs to respond to
repressive regulations designed to limit their ability to engage in advocacy, and organizations that adapt to these regulations are well-positioned to then shape those
regulations in their favor. I illustrate this argument with case studies of Article 19
and AMERA International, demonstrating how organizations with high programmatic flexibility are able to navigate strict regulations and potentially shape do3d431fa on 2020-01-28
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mestic policy in their target country, while those lacking this flexibility are shut
out of policy discussions and, eventually, the target country itself. I conclude by
addressing the central theoretical argument of this issue, exploring how the interaction between resources and institutions shapes and constrains the effects of interest
groups in global governance.

Resource conﬁgurations, institutional arrangements, and mission pressures
Resource configurations are core determinants of INGO strategy. A rich literature on nonprofit management looks at how funding sources, organizational culture, and other managerial practices enable NGOs to act efficiently and achieve
their stated goals. The ways NGOs structure their relationships with their boards
(Renz 2004), ethically manage donations (Kerlin 2006), train employees and volunteers (Watson and Abzug 2010), increase their geographic reach through franchises
and branches (Oster 1992), or work with local partners (Stiles 2002) all have direct
bearing on organizational effectiveness. Importantly, however, there is no ideal
configuration of resources. Herman and Renz (2004) show that practices that enhance effectiveness in one NGO will not directly translate to practices in another
organization. Similarly, the pursuit of one type of resource over others can place
organizational strategy at risk. Consistent funding is essential, but the pursuit of
different sources of money can reshape organizational priorities and lead to mission
drift (AbouAssi 2013). Collaboration with other NGOs can expand organizational
capacity, but it can also lead to mission drift or suppress less popular social objectives (Pallas and Nguyen 2018; Witesman and Heiss 2016). Rather than adhere to
a set of universal best practices, NGOs that ensure their current configuration of
resources aligns with their core values and mission are better able to reach their
advocacy goals and affect policy change.
INGO resource configurations are shaped in part by institutional constraints, including the legal regulations, political trends, and cultural norms of home and target
countries (Heiss and Johnson 2016). In contrast with resource configurations, the
effect of institutions on INGOs is relatively understudied (Bloodgood, TremblayBoire, and Prakash 2014). Stroup (2012) shows that the organizational structures
and missions of INGOs are deeply tied to the cultural and legal environments of
their home countries. Newer work has turned to the influences of target country
institutions on INGOs. International advocacy organizations often engage in geographic forum shopping, establishing offices in countries with the most amenable
institutional arrangements in repressive regions, or building the ‘best house in a
bad neighborhood’ (Barry et al. 2015). INGO access to advocacy venues is also
shaped by institutional factors. Henry et al. (this special issue) demonstrate how
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both home-country political institutions and international organization norms determine NGO participation in global governance institutions. Table 1 provides a
list of general examples of organizational and institutional characteristics. INGOs
typically have direct control over their resource configurations and strive to align
their resources with their missions. Organizations have less control over institutional constraints, but will still seek out favorable donors, legal environments, and
target countries.
Table 1: Resource conﬁgurations and institutional constraints
Examples of elements of resource conﬁgurations

Examples of institutional constraints

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• Donor demands and expectations
• Target country regime’s perception of contentiousness of
INGO programming
• Legal environment and regulations in target country
• Political trends in target country
• Accessibility of neighboring countries

Predictable and consistent revenue
Highly trained managers, staff, and volunteers
Carefully managed organizational structure
Careful board oversight
Geographic reach
Collaborative relationships with other organizations
Staff with local connections

The interaction between resources and institutions influences organizational
strategy and can make it difficult to achieve advocacy objectives. Institutional
pressures from donors and governments can encourage INGOs to change their
missions and create inefficiencies in programming (Heiss and Kelley 2017). Government grants can crowd out and replace private donations and strict reporting
requirements can shift organizational priorities towards bureaucratic compliance
and away from their core missions (Bush 2015; Kim and Van Ryzin 2014).
Target country institutional dynamics also impose pressures to shift mission
strategies. Repressive governments attempt to limit the foreign influence of guest
INGOs and mitigate their potential political risks while simultaneously reaping
benefits from their expertise and money (Heiss 2019). The relationship between
governments and INGOs is defined largely by the contentiousness of INGO programming and how well it aligns with regime preferences. Organizations working
on issues that correspond to less contentious issues like disaster relief or education face less regulatory pressure than organizations working on more threatening issues like human rights. Governments reduce the risks of contentious INGOs
through regulations that are designed to create a less tolerant institutional environment for INGOs and to encourage changes in programming in order to remain
active in the country (Heiss 2017).

3d431fa on 2020-01-28
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Figure 1: Relationship between institutional constraints, resource conﬁgurations, programmatic ﬂexibility, and advocacy effects

Programmatic ﬂexibility
Advocacy INGOs thus face natural pressure to change their core missions and
strategies as they pursue better resource configurations or confront restrictive institutional constraints. What enables these organizations to cope with regulations
and have advocacy effects in their target countries without losing focus on their
missions? Moreover, what allows organizations to then reshape those institutional
constraints? I theorize that the interplay of organizational resource configurations
within target country institutional constraints creates programmatic flexibility that
allows INGOs to adapt to their institutional environment without losing mission
focus (see Figure 1). This flexibility enables organizations to overcome legal barriers and succeed in having advocacy effects, which in turn allows organizations to
influence the future institutional and legal constraints of their target countries and
potentially take control of the regulations they face.
Resources and constraints each act semi-independently in shaping an organization’s flexibility and enabling it to achieve its advocacy goals. An organization
with consistent revenue streams, trained professional staff, strategic alignment with
donor expectations, collaborative relationships with other advocacy groups, and
access to multiple countries through a network of regional offices can be said to
have a positive resource configuration, which in turn provides it with a degree of
programmatic flexibility. Organizations with a negative resource configuration, in
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contrast, might be underfunded, work within a limited geographic scope, or engage
in poor managerial practices.
Resources alone do not determine an organization’s flexibility. An organization
that faces a favorable legal environment and engages in non-contentious programming has positive institutional constraints. Even if such an organization is managed poorly or struggles to attract donors or funding, it will still be able to be more
flexible in the implementation of its programs. Organizations working on more
contentious issues in countries with harsh legal restrictions that prohibit advocacy,
on the other hand, face negative institutional constraints and are naturally more
limited in the strategies they can undertake. Under these constrained institutional
conditions, organizations must rely on more positive resource configurations to
maintain their programmatic flexibility and achieve their advocacy goals. At the
same time, institutional constraints – such as a regime’s perception of an INGO’s
contentiousness – can directly shape INGO resource configurations. For instance,
ongoing research shows that donor states withdraw funding for overseas NGOs in
the wake of regulatory crackdown (Chaudhry and Heiss 2019).
The interaction between resources and constraints creates programmatic flexibility. If constraints are permissive enough or if an INGO has sufficient resources,
it will have the flexibility to make adjustments without shifting its mission. Advocacy groups with high levels of programmatic flexibility are in the best position to
overcome constrained institutional arrangements, maintain access to their target
countries, achieve their desired advocacy goals, and influence policy domestically
and globally. If an organization enjoys consistent revenue, it can better cope with
inevitable losses in revenue following passage of laws banning foreign funding. If
an organization establishes offices in countries near more restrictive states, it can
shift staff and resources out of a country when facing legal crackdown while continuing its work throughout the region. Organizations with low levels of flexibility,
on the other hand, are unable to quickly cope with shifts in target-country institutional arrangements and subsequently lose access to or are banned from those
countries, and thus fail to have advocacy effects.
I illustrate this argument with two case studies of INGOs with varying resource
configurations, target country institutional constraints, and programmatic flexibility. The experiences of Article 19, a prominent freedom of expression advocacy
INGO, and AMERA International, an INGO advocating for refugee rights in the
Middle East and Africa, demonstrate how flexibility permits organizations to attain
their desired advocacy goals and potentially reshape their institutional constraints.
Both organizations work in the Middle East and face similar legal restrictions, but
with diverging outcomes. Despite its contentious programming, Article 19 has been
resilient in the face of authoritarian restrictions in its target countries and its programmatic flexibility has enabled it to reshape domestic policy in Tunisia and else3d431fa on 2020-01-28

7

where. AMERA, on the other hand, enjoyed a cooperative relationship with Egyptian government officials as it provided services and engaged in advocacy that was
non-threatening to the regime. However, as civic space constricted following the
2011 Arab Spring, AMERA’s inflexibility forced it to withdraw from the country.
I draw on evidence from these organizations’ published materials and annual
reports, as well as in-person interviews with senior staff. As these interviews were
performed as part of a larger project on INGO responses to authoritarian restrictions, participants were guaranteed anonymity. In each case, I identify the resource configurations and institutional constraints that determine each organization’s level of programmatic flexibility. I then trace how each either drew on this
flexibility to overcome restrictions, reshape domestic regulations, and strengthen
global governance norms, or failed to respond to changes in regulations and subsequently exited the country. Importantly, I do not engage in hypothesis testing.
There is too much variation in resource configurations and institutional constraints
within each of these cases to isolate their influence on programmatic flexibility and
advocacy effects. These cases do, however, usefully illustrate the role of flexibility
in achieving advocacy goals and potentially taking control of regulatory environments.

Article 19
Article 19 takes its name from the nineteenth article of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which establishes the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The organization’s stated mission is to ‘work so that people everywhere can
express themselves freely, access information and enjoy freedom of the press’.1 To
promote individual expression the organization publishes research papers, issues
statements, and releases advocacy letters that discourage repressive regimes from
passing laws to abrogate assembly and speech rights. Article 19 also works directly
with local lawyers to defend the rights of people imprisoned for self-expression and
lobbies and advises politicians and bureaucrats as they draft new laws to regulate
expression. To ensure access to information, Article 19 lobbies governments for
Right to Information (RTI) laws that guarantee access to public information and
promote government transparency and accountability. Article 19 has had substantial effects in both global governance structures and in its target countries’ policies,
shaping international standards for freedom of expression and working directly
with dozens of governments to establish and reform domestic laws, including Serbia, Uganda, Macedonia, and Tunisia (Berliner 2016; Landman and Abraham 2004,
32).
1. Article 19, ‘Mission’, https://www.article19.org/pages/en/mission.html, accessed August 2, 2017.
3d431fa on 2020-01-28
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Resource conﬁgurations

Like other contentious foreign advocacy NGOs, Article 19 has been stymied by anticivil society laws in many of the countries it lobbies, including Egypt, Russia, China,
Azerbaijan. These laws, such as Russia’s 2012 Foreign Agent Law, are designed to
prevent domestic NGOs with ties to foreign sponsors from obtaining funding from
abroad and to limit access to foreign INGOs. However, Article 19 has adapted to
and circumvented many of these restrictions by relying on positive resource configurations: steady streams of revenue that keep the organization afloat, partially
decentralized managerial structures that provide it with global reach, and collaborative relationships with other NGOs and governments that expand its ability to
lobby.
The bulk of Article 19’s funding comes from governments and private foundations. Roughly half its income comes from British government agencies (Stroup 2012, 180), including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development (DFID), and embassies. The remainder
comes from other foreign governments, primarily Sweden and Norway, the European Commission, and American foundations, including the Open Society Foundations (OSF) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Article 19 has
maintained a steady flow of revenue over time, shifting and seeking out new grants
as needed. For instance, after funding from the Open Society Foundations dried up
in 2004, the organization replaced the shortfall with grants from the Ford Foundation. In general, the organization has maintained a balanced or surplus budget,
which has allowed it to expand its operations to a global scale (see top panel of
Figure 2).

Steady revenue

Since the early 2000s, Article 19 has divided its advocacy work by region,
assigning staff to portfolios of countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and
the Middle East and North Africa, each overseen by an expert program officer. The
organization also maintains issue-specific programs focused on law, operations,
and digital advocacy, covering its work across all regions. Prior to 2005, beyond
a few small regional offices in Latin America, most of Article 19’s staff were based
in London, with program officers traveling regularly to their assigned regions and
communicating with implementing partners remotely. In 2007, the organization
declared that it would establish some sort of physical presence on every continent,
including the ‘posting of staff, opening of local/regional offices, and/or institutionalised partnership (franchise) with local NGOs’ (Article 19 2008, 18). Today Article
19 has a nearly global reach (see Figure 3). Each local office is governed by its own
board of directors that is charged with implementing the programs and strategy
organized and proposed by the central London office.
Geography
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Figure 2: Article 19’s income, expenditures, and full-time staff, 2004–15

Article 19 Headquarters
Mexico and Central America
Sénégal and West Africa

Tunisia and MENA
Bangladesh and South Asia
Kenya and East Africa

Brazil and South America

Figure 3: Article 19’s headquarters and regional oﬃces
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Article 19’s focus on global advocacy was made possible because of this new network of regional and national offices. Between 2011–13, in conjunction with its goal
of reaching every continent, the organization quadrupled its number of full-time
employees (see bottom panel of Figure 2) and spread its new staff to its regional
offices. This global reach gives the organization increased access to government
officials, enhances its lobbying ability, and allows it to stay abreast of regulatory
changes. Most importantly, this network provides a safe home in restricted regions
(Barry et al. 2015), which in turn allows it to shift resources and programs around as
institutional environments constrict. For instance, as legal environments for civil
society worsened in Libya and Egypt, Article 19 could cut back on some of its programming while continuing to have a Middle Eastern presence with its office in
Tunisia. The organization made similar regional shifts in East Africa, maintaining
its headquarters in Kenya as anti-civil society laws were passed in Ethiopia and Sudan. Article 19 remains involved in these closed countries by maintaining regional
toeholds in countries with more open regulations. 2
Finally, Article 19 maintains close relationships with more than 90 different governments, IGOs, and INGOs,3 and was a founding member of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), a global network of advocacy NGOs.
Today, IFEX boasts more than 100 organizational members, including prominent
human rights organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Human Rights
Watch, Reporters without Borders, and PEN International.4 Participation in issue
networks like IFEX boosts Article 19’s lobbying and litigation capacity and grants
access to countries and resources that are closed off due to strict regulations. Article
19 continues to issue legal analyses and censorious press releases about repression
in Russia because it shares information with IFEX members who still have access
to the country, like the Russia-based Mass Media Defence Centre.5
Collaboration

Confronting restrictions with programmatic ﬂexibility

Moving strategic planning and implementation away from Article 19’s central offices in London was designed to enhance the organization’s access to remote partners, allowing it to ‘respond more swiftly to opportunities or crises, … be closer to
2. Interview 1056, October 13, 2016, London.
3. Article 19, ‘What we do’, https://www.article19.org/pages/en/what-we-do.html, accessed August 2, 2017.
4. IFEX, ‘Our Network’, https://www.ifex.org/our_network/, accessed August 2, 2017..
5. Article 19, ‘Russia: 50+ international and Russian NGOs contemn Telegram block and Russia’s assault on Internet freedom,’ https://www.article19.org/resources/russia-international-andrussian-ngos-condemn-telegram-block-and-russias-assault-on-freedom-of-expression-online/, accessed September 29, 2018.
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[its] partners, work more closely with them, and thus be more capable to respond
to their demands and strengthen interactions and capacities’ (Article 19 2009, 38).
Beyond extending the organization’s global reach by moving its experts to the field,
decentralization also provided legal and regulatory benefits and allowed Article 19’s
central offices to better handle the complexities of each country’s registration regulations. These offices were formally registered according to each country’s foreign
NGO regulations, and to smooth the registration process and work around regulations, each office was established as part of projects funded by large donors. Article
19 Mexico, for example, was created in 2008 as part of an RTI advocacy campaign
– its local registration was incidental to the overall program. Other regional offices
followed a similar pattern: Article 19 Brazil and Article 19 Bangladesh were both
incorporated in 2008 while implementing RTI programs funded by DFID, while
Article 19 Kenya was registered in 2007 to undertake a project in Sudan funded
by the European Commission and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Article 19 2009, 38). Article 19 collaborated with its funders to overcome and avoid
registration hurdles. Not only did bundling the registration of its regional offices
with larger grants sponsored by governmental aid agencies expedite the registration process in each country, linking registration to grant fulfillment imbued Article
19’s regional offices and programs with international legitimacy.
Article 19 further ensured the success of their remote registration by strategically selecting countries with the most amenable legal environments. In the past
decade, the organization has considered establishing a more formal presence in
countries like Egypt and China, but concluded that the regulatory environments
for INGOs in these countries would require too many legal resources to keep any
offices open.6 When deciding where to expand its regional offices, Article 19 selects
countries where it can have the most impact – both in-country and throughout the
region – with the least amount of government interference. For instance, the organization has offices in Bangladesh, Kenya, and Tunisia, which have more relaxed
registration laws than their regional neighbors like India, Ethiopia, or Egypt. The
organization formally registered its office in Tunisia in 2011 precisely because it
was the ‘safe option’.7 Because post-revolutionary laws regarding NGO registration were more open than any other country in the region, Tunisia became a safe
central home base for Article 19’s Middle Eastern programming.
Article 19 can afford to be selective in where it places its regional offices because
of its programmatic flexibility. Since it already has an established headquarters in
London, it can take time to deliberate and debate possible regional offices. With
steady revenue, it can take more risks regarding program expansion. Additionally,
6. Interview 1056, October 13, 2016, London.
7. Interview 1056, October 13, 2016, London.

3d431fa on 2020-01-28

12

because it has multiple programs spread across the world, the organization can
more easily close and relocate its offices. In the 1990s, prior to the Article 19’s official policy of decentralization, it incorporated Article 19 South Africa as a regional
subsidiary organization. Rising operational costs and increasing difficulties with
coordination led to the office’s closure in 2004 (Stroup 2012, 180; Article 19 2005b),
but leaving the country did not end the organization’s regional programming. From
its base in London, the organization continued to hold workshops, lobby politicians,
consult bureaucrats, and litigate against censorship throughout the region (Article
19 2005a, 2006).
Drawing on programmatic ﬂexibility to shape regulations

When working in countries with restricted civic space, Article 19 bundles issues of
expression and assembly to lobby for both simultaneously, arguing that ‘the defence of freedom of expression and access to information is essentially the defence
of civic space’ (Article 19 2015, 8). This, in turn, has powerful knock-on effects: improving the legal environment in one country allows the organization to maintain
its access throughout the region and have advocacy effects on global expression
and associational laws.
Tunisia provides a prime example of how the organization’s resource configuration allows it to overcome restrictions and influence policy and regulations.
Article 19 began working in the country in 2005 as part of the Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG), a special eight-year endeavor organized by IFEX. Working
with regional and international partners such as the Arabic Network for Human
Rights Information, Index on Censorship, Freedom House, and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, IFEX-TMG sent regular fact-finding and consulting
missions to Tunisia, culminating in multiple reports outlining legislative recommendations to enhance media freedom, end censorship, and improve the rights of
association, assembly, and movement (IFEX-TMG 2005, 2010). Under President Ben
Ali’s rule, few recommendations were likely to be implemented. However, following the president’s overthrow during the 2011 Arab Spring, Article 19 was ideally
positioned to influence human rights policy in the country and opened a formal
regional office in Tunis. Building on relationships established during IFEX-TMG
missions, newly-elected Tunisian politicians solicited technical advice from Article 19 on issues related to freedom of expression and human rights more generally.
The organization held workshops for legislators, offered regular comments on the
nascent constitution, and worked with the president and party chairs to ensure
that the legal environment for speech and assembly in the newly democratizing
country would be safe and inviting (Article 19 2013). In January 2014, the country’s
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) adopted a new constitution that generally
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accorded with international human rights standards. Prominent politicians cited
Article 19’s assistance throughout the drafting process, including interim president
Moncef Marzouki and NCA president Mustapha Ben Jafar (Article 19 2015, 16).
Despite these new constitutional protections, subsequent governments have
continued to infringe on expression rights. However, secure in its legal status,
Article 19 has been able to continue its work in Tunisia, issuing 87 advocacy letters
and statements since the fall of Ben Ali in 2011, condemning government abuses,
censorship, and arrests of journalists and activists. The organization’s close connections with local politicians – as well as the more permissive legal environment
for advocacy in general – allow Article 19 to continue its mission and litigate against
the government.
Additionally, Article 19 has been able to use Tunisia as a regional home base.
Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and other Middle Eastern countries have imposed strict INGO
regulations, either by preventing registration or by passing laws that make human
rights advocacy illegal. To get around these restrictions, Article 19 brings regional
activists to its Tunisia office for training and research, rather than sending staff to
those more restrictive countries.8 Accordingly, despite closed and dangerous civic
space, Article 19 has been able to continue its post-Arab Spring advocacy, issuing
reports and policy briefs to countries throughout the region.
Laws impeding Article 19’s work in the Middle East are generally designed to
make operating an INGO abroad more difficult and costly. Article 19 has adapted
to these increasingly onerous regulations and continued its advocacy by relying on
its programmatic flexibility. Collaboration with IFEX-TMG, politicians, and local
NGOs in the years prior to the revolution, consistent government- and foundationbased funding, and highly trained staff allowed Article 19 to rapidly establish an
office in 2011 and have positioned the organization to remain active in the region.
Within the more favorable institutional conditions in Tunisia, this configuration
of resources provided the organization with substantial flexibility in continuing its
operations throughout the region – thus ensuring advocacy effects – and in shaping
future institutional constraints, creating a more favorable operating environment
in Tunisia.

AMERA
Article 19’s reserves of programmatic flexibility, fueled by a positive resource configuration and a favorable institutional environment in Tunisia, enabled it to circumvent regulations, maintain an antagonistic relationship with its target countries, and ultimately reshape regulations to be more favorable when needed. The
8. Interview 1056, October 13, 2016, London.
3d431fa on 2020-01-28

14

case of Africa and Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA)9 International, in contrast, demonstrates how sudden changes in a target country’s institutional arrangements can pose challenges to advocacy groups low in flexibility. AMERA was an
international advocacy NGO that provided legal services for refugees in Egypt and
lobbied for improved refugee policies throughout the region. Driven by the belief
that ‘legal aid … is the right of all refugees’,10 AMERA’s mission was to ‘provide
pro bono legal aid for refugees in countries where such services are non-existent
or limited and where legal representation might assist them in actualizing their
rights’.11 Since its incorporation in 2003, AMERA has provided a variety of programs, including pro bono litigation and advocacy, refugee status determination,
social support for survivors of human trafficking and sex- and gender-based violence, resettlement assistance, and assistance for unaccompanied minors.
Resource conﬁgurations

AMERA benefitted from multiple positive resource configurations, including welltrained staff and close collaborative relationships with similar refugee rights organizations, but its irregular and uncertain revenue, combined with a constricting
legal environment in Egypt, hampered its programmatic flexibility despite its less
non-contentious programming and its friendly relationship with the government.
Consequently, it was unable to exert advocacy effects on the Egyptian government
and reshape refugee or civil society regulations.
AMERA had a small, highly experienced staff, ranging
from 20–30 full-time employees between 2004 and 2013, split between its UK and
Egypt offices (see bottom panel of Figure 4).12 The organization also relied on volunteer interns to help with paralegal, administrative, and translation work. Staff
and volunteers were diverse, well-trained, and fit the needs of the organization’s
constituents, providing AMERA with the necessary language skills, legal expertise,
psychologists, and community outreach to provide legal aid and representation to
nearly 1,400 clients (AMERA UK 2011, 3). Egyptians on staff gave AMERA resources
Staff with local connections

9. As described below, there is a legal distinction between AMERA UK, AMERA Egypt, and AMERA International. For the sake of narrative simplicity, I refer to the organization as AMERA unless
describing something specific to the organization’s operations in the UK or Egypt.
10. AMERA UK, ‘Objectives and History’, https://web.archive.org/web/20130820091141/http://
amera-uk.org/index.php/who-we-are/objectives-a-history, accessed August 2, 2017.
11. AMERA International, ‘Background’, http://www.amerainternational.org/background/, accessed August 2, 2017; AMERA International, ‘Who We Are’, http://www.amerainternational.org/
who-we-are/, accessed August 2, 2017.
12. AMERA’s fiscal year ends on January 31 of the following year. To align its financial reports with
a January–December calendar year, I shift all reported numbers back one year. Thus, financial figures
for the year ending on January 31, 2009 are marked as 2008.
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Figure 4: AMERA’s income, expenditures, and full-time staff, 2004–15

to confront the changing legal environment, while staff and volunteers from Sudan,
Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea allowed the organization to maximize its contacts in
the refugee community in Cairo.
Unlike Article 19, which operates in dozens of countries through its
home and regional offices, AMERA did not enjoy wide geographic reach (see Figure 5). AMERA’s refugee assistance required direct one-on-one legal advocacy on
the ground, thus the organization was naturally limited in their geographic scope.
AMERA UK was created to be an overarching international umbrella organization
for assisting with refugee rights and advocacy throughout the global south (AMERA
UK 2008, 3), and the organization began with regional headquarters in Egypt and a
pilot refugee law program in Uganda. AMERA’s work in Uganda was an early success, and its pilot program was soon spun off into an independent NGO.13 In 2012,
AMERA UK identified and began working with new partners in Morocco (Droit
et Justice) and Cameroon (Refugee Welfare Association Cameroon) (AMERA UK
Geography

13. AMERA’s fundraising commitments for this spinoff ended in 2013 (AMERA UK 2014)
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AMERA UK (2003–2013) / AMERA International (2015–)
Droit et Justice (2012–)
Refugee Welfare Association Cameroon (2012–)

AMERA Egypt (2003–2013)

Refugee Law Project (2003–)

Figure 5: AMERA’s oﬃces and primary partners

2013), but due to budget crises and legal challenges in Egypt, expansion was slow.
Moving its programs between countries that impose legal restrictions was not an
effective response to legal crackdowns.
AMERA cultivated partnerships with refugee and human rights organizations from its headquarters in Egypt, including the Egyptian Foundation
for Refugee Rights, Caritas, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
St. Andrews Refugee Services, Catholic Relief Services, and the El Nadeem Center
for Psychological Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture. In partnering
with these organizations, AMERA Egypt was able to connect refugees with additional psychological, financial, and legal support, as well as shelter, food, family
reunion services, education, and medical care. More importantly, this collaboration put AMERA at the center of a growing network of refugee-related NGOs in
Cairo (AMERA UK 2014, 2), a position that later proved instrumental for continued
service provision after the organization left the country.
Collaboration

AMERA’s most significant obstacle was its inconsistent and unpredictable revenue (see Figure 4). Since its inception, the organization received the
majority of its funding from donations from Comic Relief, a UK-based nonprofit
that raises money through annual comedy broadcasts. As seen in the middle panel
of Figure 4, grants from Comic Relief accounted for 85% of AMERA’s income in
2004 and between 50–90% of the organization’s revenue thereafter. Comic Relief
funding dropped in 2013, just as AMERA Egypt faced the most regulatory pressure,
and by 2015 the two organizations’ partnership ended.
Unsteady revenue
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Recognizing its lack of income diversification, in 2007 AMERA UK hired a new
executive director tasked with stabilizing the organization’s revenue (AMERA UK
2009, 2). The organization received grants from the Sigrid Rausing Trust, the Amberstone Trust, the Ford Foundation, and the US State Department and Swiss and
US embassies in Cairo. AMERA’s income peaked at more than £600,000 in 2008,
but in subsequent years the organization slowly lost its foundation and government
funding, and by 2015 it was funded exclusively by a grant from the State Department and £5,000 in private donations. The loss of funding from Comic Relief and
the inability to maintain regular foundation and government funding put AMERA
in a precarious situation as it confronted legal and safety challenges in Egypt.
Succumbing to restrictions and shutting down

AMERA’s most challenging legal obstacle – and the issue that led to its withdrawal
from Egypt – was its inability to formally register as a civil society organization,
which in turn posed a threat to its safety and continued operations. Unlike AMERA’s Refugee Law Project in Uganda, AMERA Egypt did not become fully independent.
Prior to the 2011 Arab Spring, advocacy organizations in Egypt were regulated
by Law 84 of 2002, which required that all civil society organizations be registered
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In practice, however, Egyptian officials enforced this law with great discretion and many NGOs did not register. AMERA
UK began the process of registering AMERA Egypt as its official branch in Cairo
in 2010, having already worked in the country for several years (AMERA UK 2011,
3). One director noted that ‘[b]ecause we were doing what the government was
happy to have done, the government tolerated us’,14 despite the lack of official registration. AMERA Egypt partnered with a local law firm that provided pro bono
legal support for the registration process (AMERA UK 2012, 7), and waited for its
application to wind through the Egyptian bureaucracy.
In 2011, however, the institutional environment for all INGOs working in Egypt
changed dramatically. Initially, the organization’s primary concern was safety, as
protests leaned towards violence in the months following Hosni Mubarak’s resignation. AMERA Egypt periodically shut down its main offices during the worst political unrest, and staff met with clients offsite to continue the organization’s work
with as few interruptions as possible (AMERA UK 2012, 2). Despite the turbulence,
AMERA continued to assist with asylum applications, legal consulting, and victim
counseling, while its UK trustees began to set aside reserves to ensure that the organization could ‘meet the costs of closure or wind-down’ if circumstances warranted
14. Interview 1036, August 17, 2016.
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it (AMERA UK 2012, 5). The registration application with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stalled amidst the political upheaval.
Beginning in 2012, the legal landscape shifted again, as post-revolutionary governments proposed draft legislation designed to severely restrict advocacy organizations with foreign connections. AMERA continued its work through 2012 and
2013, but a large influx of refugees from Syria and a dramatic drop in revenue combined with an increasingly restricted regulatory environment to put incredible pressure on the organization. AMERA Egypt increasingly relied on assistance from its
partners, working with ten other advocacy organizations to supplement their services. AMERA’s registration application remained in flux as members of parliament
debated the draft anti-NGO legislation. Without formal registration, AMERA Egypt
would not be able to obtain permission to receive funding from AMERA UK, and
the organization would shut down.
The relationship between AMERA Egypt and the Egyptian government remained
mostly amicable – police never raided their offices, detained staff, or confiscated
resources. Every time the organization communicated with its partners at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were told that the application was in order, but final
approval never arrived and their registration status was perpetually pending. In
2013, AMERA UK worried that the détente would soon come to an end. The Ministry had upped its pressure on INGOs and state security forces regularly raided
local NGOs receiving foreign funding. By the end of 2013, AMERA UK ‘saw the
handwriting on the wall’, assumed that its legal status would never be secured, and
began the process of transferring the operations of AMERA Egypt to the Egyptian
Foundation for Refugee Rights (EFRR).15
In 2014, AMERA UK closed AMERA Egypt, temporarily reincorporated as the
International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) in the UK (IRRI 2015), and continued
to send grants to EFRR, though with little input into the management of its programs. In October 2014, EFRR took full control over all programs and in 2015, IRRI
completed its drawdown from Egypt, changed its name to AMERA International,
and slowly began to expand its fundraising and training activities in Morocco and
Cameroon (AMERA International 2015).
The combination of reduced resources – particularly the organization’s decline
in funding – and the prospect of worsening institutional constraints through proposed civil society restrictions left AMERA with little programmatic flexibility.
While AMERA Egypt’s strong relationships with the Cairene refugee community
and local politicians and bureaucrats put AMERA in a position to lobby for improved refugee and advocacy laws, it was unable to do so and ultimately left the
country.
15. Interview 1036, August 17, 2016.
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Conclusion
According to nonprofit management research, it is not surprising Article 19 – a
larger, well-funded, and better geographically positioned organization – was able
to achieve its advocacy goals and adapt to changing regulations while AMERA was
not. By incorporating the notion of programmatic flexibility, though, we find a
more complex relationship between resources and advocacy effects and uncover
fruitful connections between INGO and interest group research. Institutional constraints mediate an organization’s resources and shape its ability to both configure
its resources and find flexibility. This flexibility then allows INGOs to engage in
advocacy, and under the right conditions, influence their regulatory environments.
These cases combine disparate interest group, nonprofit management, and international relations literatures into one unified theory and pave the way for more
rigorous analysis of the individual components of Figure 1.
The interaction between internal resource configurations and the external institutional arrangements in their target countries shaped Article 19 and AMERA’s
strategies and potential for having effects on domestic and global policy. A key
factor in these organizations’ disparate outcomes is programmatic flexibility. Endowed with reliable funding, longstanding relationships with government officials,
and deep connections with local partners and larger networks of other advocacy organizations, Article 19 engaged in geographic venue shopping, overcame Tunisian
regulations, reshaped its legal environment, and maintained the contentiousness of
its mission in Tunisia and throughout the region. AMERA’s departure from Egypt,
on the other hand, occurred not only because the institutional environment worsened, but because it lacked sufficient programmatic flexibility to cope with changing regulations. In the face of regulatory, organizational, and financial uncertainty,
the organization ceased its advocacy work and left the country.
These findings also raise important questions and caveats. Is there a threshold of
institutional arrangements that makes a country more amenable to advocacy group
work and that allows INGOs to have policy effects? Article 19 purposely avoided
using Egypt as its regional home – instead it chose the country with the most manageable regulatory environment. What determines when a country becomes more
or less attractive to advocacy organizations shopping for a new headquarters?
Similarly, does a specific combination of resource configurations allow organizations to adapt to regulations? Would the outcomes of the cases have been different
had Article 19 lost the bulk of its funding or if AMERA had a wider network of
permanent offices throughout the region that could have absorbed its Egypt office?
Relatedly, configurations of resources may interact differently depending on institutional context, thus reshaping programmatic flexibility. For INGOs working in
countries that ban funding from foreign donors, reliance on deep-pocketed foreign
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donors can be a liability. Even if laws do not prohibit foreign funding, INGOs working in countries that are antagonistic to their main donors (e.g. accepting USAID
grants while working in Russia or Central Asia) will limit programmatic flexibility
and force organizations to rely on other resource configurations.
Though these questions remain unanswered in this paper, they pave the way
for exciting research agendas that continue to combine theories of resource configurations and institutional arrangements in international advocacy and global governance.
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